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JAMES WILBERDING
1. Introduction
 Plotinus scholars have recently called attention to a kind
of action in the sensible world, which one could call ‘spontaneous’
or ‘automatic’ action, that is supposed to result automatically from
the contemplation of the intelligible.1 Such action is meant to be
opposed to actions that result from reason, calculation, and plan-
ning, and has been put to work to provide a way for Plotinus’ sage
to act, and in particular to act morally, without compromising his
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where it received a helpful discussion. For comments and suggestions I am par-
ticularly indebted to Peter Adamson, Julie Cassiday, Christoph Helmig, Christoph
Horn, Jan Opsomer, David Sedley, and Carlos Steel. I have also profited greatly
from a reading group held in autumn 2005 at King’s College London on Ennead
3. 8 with Peter Adamson, Verity Harte, M. M. McCabe, and others. I would like to
thank Williams College and the Humboldt-Stiftung for funding the research leave
during which this paper was written, and Andreas Speer for welcoming me into the
Thomas-Institut for this period.
1 e.g. A. Schniewind, L’ ‹Ethique du sage chez Plotin [L’ ‹Ethique] (Paris, 2003), 190
with n. 7: ‘les actions du sage sont l’expression (piαρακολοupsilonacuteθηµα) de sa propre con-
templation . . . Plotin ‹evoque deux possibilit‹es: d’une part, les actions par faiblesse
(èσθÝνεια) de contemplation, pour ceux qui ne parviennent pas ›a l’Un;d’autre part —
et c’est l›a ce qui correspond au sage — les actions en tant qu’activit‹es secondaires
(piαρακολοupsilonacuteθηµα), issues de la contemplation’; D. O’Meara, Platonopolis (Oxford,
2003), 75: ‘As regards humans, this means that human action and production can
result as by-products, secondary e·ects, of knowledge, or, if not, as inferior sub-
stitutes for knowledge’; A. H. Armstrong, ‘Platonic Eros and Christian Agape’,
Downside Review, 75 (1961), 105–21 at 114–15 (repr. in A. H. Armstrong, Plo-
tinian and Christian Studies (London, 1979), ch. ix): ‘A man, in his opinion, will
act more virtuously if, instead of thinking “I propose to perform the following
virtuous actions”, he simply concentrates his mind on virtue so intensely that the
virtuous actions follow naturally and spontaneously as occasion requires.’ Cf. J. R.
Bussanich, ‘The Invulnerability of Goodness: The Ethical and Psychological The-
ory of Plotinus’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloqium in Ancient Philosophy, 6
(1990) 151–84 at 180–4.
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contemplation.2 This opposition is found most markedly when he
compares the non-deliberative manner in which the World-Soul
(as well as Nature and the heavenly bodies) acts with the delibera-
tive manner in which we normally act. ‘Automatic action’ is thus
a term I am using to describe this kind of spontaneous and non-
deliberative action. A theory of automatic action can easily close
the gap between the contemplative man and the practical man by
allowing for action without deliberation. This is helpful because
it is the deliberative element in action that would seem to be in-
compatiblewith contemplation.Deliberating about theworld—and
deliberation is always about the world, since it is about what can
be otherwise3—forces one’s rational soul to look away from the in-
telligible to the sensible.
Since this theory has so far been introduced only in a rather
cursory manner, I would like to investigate it more closely. What
is needed is a more detailed examination of the evidence in favour
of the theory and a psychological account that would explain how
such action would arise. In addition, the scope of the thesis needs
to be determined: just which kinds of action can be performed
automatically? Moreover, we need to consider the possibility that
deliberation and attention to the sensible world might be in some
sense compatible with contemplation after all. As I shall argue in
what follows, themetaphysics of Plotinus’ psychologycommits him
to something like a theory of automatic action, and this is corro-
borated by his views both on the employment of craft knowledge
and on the motion of the heavenly bodies. Yet there also seems
to be considerable evidence for denying that the sage’s actions are
always performed in such an automatic manner. Sometimes it ap-
pears that he must deliberate, but this is mitigated by the fact that
there seems to be a sense in which deliberation about the sensible
world is compatible with contemplation after all. In short, the auto-
matic execution of practical actions is the ideal but the deliberative
execution of them is often a necessity. The extent to which this
necessity asserts itself in the sage’s life is uncertain.
2 Not all scholars, however, are in agreement on this. J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The
Road to Reality [Road] (Cambridge, 1967), for example, insists ‘the brave man is
not an automaton whose reflexes simply cause him to act bravely. That is certainly
not how Plotinus understands any virtue’ (132).
3 This derives from Aristotle: EN 3. 3 and 1139a13–14.
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2. Praxis in Ennead 3. 8
Before turning to the positive grounds for attributing a theory of
automatic action to Plotinus, it is necessary to clear the table a bit
by dispelling a piece of spurious evidence. It has been claimed that
in 3. 8 Plotinus says that practical action (praxis) can be either an
automatic by-product of contemplation or else amere substitute for
it for those who cannot contemplate e·ectively.4However, nowhere
in 3. 8 does Plotinus give the former positive and automatic account
of praxis.
Ennead 3. 8 is Plotinus’ most in-depth discussion of contem-
plation and action, and central to this discussion is a distinc-
tion between productive action (po»esis, poiein) and practical action
(praxis, prattein), a distinction that Plotinus maintains consistently
throughout 3. 8. Right at the start of this section Plotinus under-
lines the negative aspect of practical action:
Every practical action is eager to arrive at contemplation, the necessary
practical actions more so [ µÁν èναγκαßα [κα"] òpi" piλÝον],5 even though they
draw contemplation towards the outer world, and the so-called volun-
tary practical actions less so, but nevertheless even these [viz. voluntary]
practical actions arise by a desire for contemplation. (3. 8. 1. 15–18)
As Plotinus says here and repeats several times throughout 3. 8,
all practical action is due to a desire for contemplation. Far from
being a by-product of contemplation, these actions all result from
an inability to contemplate on account of the feebleness of one’s
soul.6 Contrasted with this practical action is productive action,
or what one might call ‘automatic action’, which is described as
4 O’Meara, Platonopolis, 133. O’Meara then refers back to an earlier section of
his book in order to support this claim, but in this earlier section (p. 75) he supports
it entirely by 3. 8. 4. 39–47, which I shall discuss below.
5 This is Theiler’s emendation. Although it is not adopted by Henry–Schwyzer
(who print the manuscripts’ κα" òpiιpiλÝον), Theiler’s reasons are compelling and have
mostly to do with the parallels between this passage and 4. 4. 44 and 6. 3. 16 (to
which he refers): ‘der Zwang entschuldigt, nicht die willentliche Wahl’. What is
puzzling about the received text is the way that voluntary action is described. It is
first said to be less directed at the outer world than necessary action, from which we
should expect itmore than necessary action to result from a desire for contemplation.
But Plotinus defies this expectation when he says that ‘nevertheless [¬µως] even this’
voluntary action springs from a desire for contemplation. Why would anyone think
otherwise, if voluntary action really is less directed at the outer world? It might even
be possible to retain the καß in the sense of ‘even’.
6 Cf. 3. 8. 4. 31–6 (cited below) and 3. 8. 6. 1–4.
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an action that flows from contemplation as its natural by-product.
Plotinus consistently uses piοιεãν and γεννëν to refer to this brand
of activity.7
In 3. 8. 6 Plotinus narrows down his conception of praxis even
further through an inventive exegesis of Plato’s divided line. The
goal of the ascent is no»esis, i.e. the contemplation of Nous in the
best way possible, which is the contemplation of it as Nous itself
contemplates, namely without any division between subject and
object. Yet as long as one is still below Nous, it is not Nous itself
but the logos of it that forms the object of one’s intellectual acti-
vity. Plotinus’ account begins at the level of belief (pistis). The man
of practical action is at this level. Owing to the feebleness of his
soul, the only way he can understand the logos of Nous is through
practical actions. These actions create a logos in his soul that gives
him at least some conception of the intelligible. To the extent that
he now has this, he can refrain from practical action. Importantly,
there are degrees of pistis, which means that the logos that the prac-
tical man receives in his soul can vary in clarity. Plotinus seems
to be suggesting that the first stage of one’s epistemic journey is
practical, and that if one is successful at this stage the logos cre-
ated by practical action will become clearer and clearer until the
soul finally appropriates it as its own (oikeion, 3. 8. 6. 1–21). Once
the logos has been appropriated, one is at the level of discursive
thought (dianoia)—an intermediate stage between pistis and proper
contemplation (no»esis). As before, one’s epistemic relation to Nous
is still deficient, and as before this deficiency leads to a specific kind
of activity. At this level, however, the activity is no longer practical
7 piοιεãν and γεννëν are used synonymously in 3. 8. 1. 20–1. Throughout 3. 8. 2,
which is devoted to Nature, Plotinus never uses piρÜττειν. Rather, Nature is said
to piοιεãν a γÝννηµα (3. 8. 2. 29, cf. 3. 8. 4. 29–31). Likewise, the higher Soul and
the logoi in it are said to γεννëν and are explicitly said not to piρÜττειν (3. 8. 4. 10–
14). Hence, γÝννηµα (3. 8. 4. 16) and γεννηθÝν (3. 8. 4. 29) are used to describe the
automatic outflowings of higher principles. In 3. 8. 7. 4–6 Plotinus contrasts the
piρÜξεις which are aimed at contemplation with the γεννÞσεις which proceed from
contemplation. This is further confirmed in 3. 8. 5. 22–5. Here again γεννþµενον is
used in opposition to piρëξις. Plotinus’ point is that Nature’s action only looks like
a piρëξις (piρëξιν δοκοupsilontildeσαν ε4ναι; in fact, it is a γεννþµενον of contemplation and itself
contemplation in a weaker form (Nature does not engage in practical action, only
humans do (3. 8. 4. 31–2)). This is not to say that Plotinus always uses piοιεãν in this
positive sense (though he might do this with γεννëν); it is too generic for that (for
example, in 3. 8. 2. 6–9 he describes craftsmen in terms of piοιεãν, and cf. 3. 8. 4. 32
and 37). Rather, when automatic action is under discussion, Plotinus must resort to
these terms, since piρÜττειν invariably signals a contemplative deficiency.
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action but discursive action (piροφÝρειν, piροχειρßζεσθαι): that is to say,
now one ascends by linguistically working through what one does
not yet understand. This points to an important di·erence between
the methods of advancing through each of these two sections. In
practical action the soul advances by responding to external needs,
whereas at this level the soul’s action responds to its own needs.8
Needless to say, here too there are degrees. To progress through
this section of the line involves eliminating the gaps in one’s under-
standing, and by doing this one ensures not merely that the logos
is one’s own (oikeion) but that it is no longer even distinct from
oneself (allo). At this point one has achieved proper contemplation
(3. 8. 6. 21–34).
Hence, there seem to be both wider and narrower conceptions of
praxis in 3. 8. According to the wider conception found throughout
3. 8. 1–5, a praxis seems to be any action that results from a feeble
soul’s desire to contemplate, regardless of whether it is a physical
action performed with one’s hands or a linguistic one performed
with one’s head. In 3. 8. 6 we find it used in a narrower sense that
refers only to the former. Yet in both cases a practical action is
one that occurs in the absence of contemplation and not as its by-
product. This also holds for the passage that is sometimes cited9 as
support for the claim that the sage will perform virtuous praxeis as
by-products of his contemplative activity:
Everywherewe shall see that productive andpractical action [τÂν piοßησιν κα"
τÂν piρëξιν] are either a feebleness of contemplation or a by-product of it. It
is a feebleness if one has nothing after the practical action [µετ! τ3 piραχθÝν],
and a by-product if someone has something else to contemplate that is prior
to and better than the result of the productive action [τοupsilontilde piοιηθÝντος].10 For
who, being able to contemplate what is authentic, would prefer to go to
the authentic thing’s image? And slower children also illustrate this point:
being incapable with respect to academic subjects and contemplation, they
turn to the arts and crafts. (3. 8. 4. 39–47)
8 ó µÁν γ!ρ εupsilonlenistilde piροÞνεγκεν, οupsilonlenisκÝτι piροφÝρει, ó δÁ piροφÝρει, τ®ð òλλιpiεã piροφÝρει εùς
òpißσκεψιν καταµανθÜνουσα Ñ χει. òν δÁ τοãς piρακτικοãς òφαρµüττει ó χει τοãς ξω (3. 8.
6. 27–30).
9 O’Meara, Platonopolis, 75; Schniewind, L’ ‹Ethique, 190.
10 Here Plotinus might be drawing on Aristotle’s distinction between praxis and
poi»esis as described in MM 1197a3–13 (putting aside for now the question of the
MM’s authenticity—the work was in any case known to Atticus (fr. 2. 9 Des Places)),
though if he is, he reverses Aristotle’s verdict regarding the relative importance of
each. For Aristotle praxis is superior since it contains its end, and for Plotinus poi»esis
is superior because it, as it were, follows from the true end of contemplation.
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The central contrast between productive and practical action, how-
ever, is clearly at work in this passage. Plotinus describes the case
of feebleness in terms of practical action (τ3 piραχθÝν), and the by-
product in terms of productive action (τοupsilontilde piοιηθÝντος). Hence, he
is not saying that both poi»eseis and praxeis can be either feeble sub-
stitutes or by-products; rather he is reiterating what he has said all
along, namely that although praxeis are by definition feeble sub-
stitutes aimed at contemplation, there are some actions, namely
poi»eseis, which are by-products of contemplation.
3. Some evidence in favour of automatic action
This does not necessarily mean that virtuous actions cannot pro-
ceed automatically from contemplation, as some scholars have
claimed that they do. Rather, it means only that what we have
seen so far does not show this. What would be needed is some rea-
son to believe that virtuous action is not necessarily a praxis in this
technical sense but can rather be a poi»esis, and I believe several such
reasons can be provided. The first of these is drawn from the meta-
physical psychology that emerges from some of Plotinus’ remarks
elsewhere in 3. 8, while the others relate to his discussion of technai
and of celestial motion.
Plotinus’ example of the geometer in 3. 8. 4 sheds some inter-
esting light on his psychology. Recall Plato’s short discussion of
mathematics in the passage ofRepublic 6 on the divided line. There
the student of mathematics is described as beginning his study by
‘using what were previouslyoriginals as images [τοãς τüτε µιµηθεãσιν
½ς εùκüσιν χρωµÝνη]’ (510 b 4), and this is spelt out a little more fully
in the sequel: ‘the things which they mould and draw . . . they
use as images in their search to apprehend those things which one
can apprehend only by thought [dianoia]’ (510 e 1–511 a 2). Of
course, the method, role, and objects of mathematics in the line
are all subjects of much debate, but what is important here is that
Plato presents the physical activity of drawing geometrical figures
as what Plotinus would describe as a practical activity. The student
of mathematics draws figures because he is seeking to understand
something more intelligible. Hence, this is an activity that aims to
correct a contemplative deficiency. It would be di¶cult to maintain
that Plotinus disagreed with Plato here by denying that drawing
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geometrical figures is an activity that can help one—at least at some
stage—ascend to contemplation, and this is why what Plotinus says
about geometers in the course of Nature’s speech in 3. 8. 4 is so
striking: ‘My contemplating produceswhat is contemplated, just as
geometers draw by contemplating.’11Nature likens her production to
that of geometers, but since throughout 3. 8 Nature is described in
terms of productive activity and is denied any practical activity,12
what we have here is a description of actual geometers engaged in
productive activity: their drawings are by-products of their con-
templation. This strongly suggests that the same activities, namely
drawing figures, that were performed as practical actions in order
to achieve a contemplative state will continue to be performed in
the contemplative state, only this time as productive actions.
This view is so remarkable that one might wonder why Plotinus
even held it. It surely seems reasonable to say that a student who
is striving to understand geometry in a purely intellectual manner
will require some kind of visual aid to help himor her conceptualize
the subject-matter. But why would an accomplished geometer who
is actually conceptualizing the subject-matter produce the same or
similar visual aids as an, as it were, automatic consequence of his
or her contemplation? I suspect an answer to this question can be
found in Plotinus’ understanding of the relation of the parts of
one’s soul to one another. For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict
our attention to three parts or powers of soul, as Plotinus often
does himself, namely the soul proper—bywhich I mean the higher
soul including reason—the sensitive soul, and the growth soul.
We are told that just as soul itself is the o·spring of Intellect and
receives form (εùδοpiοιεãσθαι) by turning to and, as it were, looking at
Intellect,13 so too are each of the lower parts of soul o·spring that
are formed by turning to their respective generators. Hence, the
sensitive and generative parts or powers of soul, being o·spring
of soul proper, are themselves informed by turning to this soul
and receiving form from it.14 Each of these three parts of soul,
11 3. 8. 4. 7–8: κα" τ3 θεωροupsilontildeν µου θεþρηµα piοιεã, 7σpiερ ο¦ γεωµÝτραι θεωροupsilontildeντες
γρÜφουσιν. 12 See n. 7.
13 Cf. 5. 1. 7. 35–49, and M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V. 1 (Oxford, 1983),
ad loc.
14 This pattern continues all the way to matter, which is itself the product of
phusis and informed by phusis, though in this one case we get an exception to the
rule. Matter cannot turn back to phusis and so phusis must itself turn to matter
a second time in order to give it form (see D. O’Brien, ‘La mati›ere chez Plotin:
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then, is essentially interested in contemplating. Moreover, since at
every ontological level turning to and contemplating what is above
are essence-determining activities, we should expect the successful
execution of these activities at one level to have consequences for the
subsequent ontological levels. More specifically, if one is successful
at turning his or her rational soul to the intelligible andmaintaining
a contemplative state, then this should have some e·ect on the
sensitive and generative parts of soul in so far as they are themselves
essentially determined by their focus on this soul.
The student of geometry has trouble contemplating the intelli-
gible all by itself because his or her rational soul is still caught up
in the lower activities of soul. To this extent, this epistemological
ascent seems to run parallel to the ascent in virtue as described in
Ennead 1. 2. There Plotinus distinguishes between two types of
virtue, which he labels ‘political’ (piολιτικαß) and ‘higher’ (µεßζους),
such that all four cardinal virtues are found in each type.15 The
point of this distinction is to reconcile two competing conceptions
of virtue in the Platonic corpus. In the Republic Plato describes
the four virtues in terms of the relationship among the appetitive,
spirited, and rational parts of soul such that the two non-rational
parts are made obedient to and harmonious with the rational part.
In the Phaedo, by contrast, the same four virtues are described in a
much di·erent manner. Rather than emphasizing the concord be-
tween the rational and irrational parts of soul, the Phaedo’s account
demands the separation of the soul from the body, which is under-
stood to mean that the rational part of soul must be separated from
the irrational,16 and it is this latter account that seems better suited
to explain the Theaetetus’s call to ‘become like god as much as pos-
sible [­µοßωσις θε®ð κατ! τ3 δυνατüν]’.17 Plotinus’ ‘higher’ virtues are
son origine, sa nature’, Phronesis, 44 (1999), 45–71). A very clear exposition of this
doctrine can be found in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum 6. 2–3 (42. 17–43. 5 Kalbfleisch).
Here Porphyry makes the plant-like soul an o·spring of the sensitive soul, and
Plotinus might have intended his remarks to be understood this way. Nevertheless,
he usually speaks in more general terms of the sensitive and generative powers both
being the o·spring of soul (e.g. 3. 4. 1. 1–3; 5. 2. 1. 19–21).
15 piολιτικαß at 1. 2. 1. 16, 21, 23; 1. 2. 2. 13–14; 1. 2. 3. 3, 5, 8, 10; 1. 2. 7. 25.
µεßζους at 1. 2. 1. 22, 26; 1. 2. 3. 2, 4; 1. 2. 6. 24; 1. 2. 7. 11, 14, 21.
16 Phaedo 67 b 6 ·. (cf. 82 a 10–b 3).
17 Theaet. 176 b 1–2. On this tension in Plato see J. M. Dillon, ‘Plotinus, Philo
and Origen on the Grades of Virtue’ [‘Virtue’], in H.-D. Blume and F. Mann (eds.),
Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift f•ur Heinrich D•orrie (M•unster, 1983), 92–
105 at 92–3, who also notes that the qualification κατ! τ3 δυνατüν takes on a new sense
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meant to capture these virtues of separation. There are two promi-
nent aspects of these higher virtues corresponding in turn to the
rational soul’s relation to what is below it and above it. Drawing
on the Phaedo’s characterization, Plotinus describes these higher
virtues in terms of purity and purification,18 that is to say in terms
of cleansing the rational part of the lower non-rational parts of soul:
It [the soul] will be good and possess virtue when it no longer has the
same opinions but acts alone—this is intelligence and wisdom—and does
not share the body’s experiences—this is self-control—and is not afraid
of departing from the body—this is courage—and is ruled by reason and
intellect, without opposition—and this is justice. (1. 2. 3. 10–19, trans.
Armstrong)
In 1. 2. 6. 11–26 Plotinus then redescribes them in terms of the
rational soul’s turning towards Intellect. These two sides of higher
virtue are what provided the occasion for Porphyry to further dis-
tinguish between di·erent kinds of higher virtue, calling the ones
‘purificatory’ and the others ‘contemplative’, and capping his list
with ‘paradigmatic’ virtues, which correspond to what Plotinus in-
sists are not virtues at all but rather the Forms of these virtues in
the Intellect.19
According to this scale of virtue, the rational soul is originally
wrapped up in the a·airs of the body and lower soul, and so virtue
is to be achieved by working with these lower powers—in particu-
lar on the appetites and spirit—training and habituating them to be
moderate. Once this is achieved, the ascent continues by working
to loosen the grip that the lower soul has on the rational soul, and
for some subsequent Platonists: ‘in virtue of that element in us which is capable of
this’ (98).
18 Phaedo 67 a ·.; Enn. 1. 2. 3. 8, 10–11, 21; 1. 2. 4. 1–9, 16–17; 1. 2. 5. 1, 21–2;
1. 2. 7. 6 and 9.
19 1. 2. 6. 13–19 and 1. 2. 7. 1–6. Cf. Porph. Sent. 32. 15–70. To what extent
Porphyry thereby accurately captures Plotinus’ meaning remains a matter of debate.
For the di·erent degrees of acceptance of Porphyry’s four degrees of virtues as a
fair interpretation of Ennead 1. 2, compare: Dillon, ‘Virtue’ 100; H.-D. Sa·rey and
A.-P. Segonds, ‘Introduction’, inMarinus: Proclus, ou sur le Bonheur, ed. and trans.
H.-D. Sa·rey, A.-P. Segonds, and C. Luna (Paris, 2001), pp. ix–clxiv at p. lxxv;
M. Vorwerk, ‘Plato on Virtue: Definitions of Σωφροσupsilonacuteνη in Plato’s Charmides and
in Plotinus Enneads I. 2 (19)’, American Journal of Philology, 122 (2001), 29–47
at 40; C. Wildberg, ‘Pros to telos: Neuplatonische Ethik zwischen Religion und
Metaphysik’, in T. Kobusch and M. Erler (eds.), Metaphysik und Religion: Zur
Signatur des sp•atantiken Denkens. Akten des internationalen Kongresses vom 13.–17.
M•arz 2001 in W•urzburg (Munich and Leipzig, 2002), 261–78 at 267.
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although in 1. 2 Plotinus does not indicate the means by which this
is to be achieved, it is likely that he saw mathematics playing an
important role here (although probably not as important as Plato
thought). Yet here too we should expect the lower powers of soul
to play some role, in so far as the rational part is still caught up in
them, only here the emphasis will be on the sensitive power. Hence,
visual images can be used to present, albeit somewhat obscurely,
intelligible content to the rational soul, which would become less
dependent on the sensible soul the more it understood of the in-
telligible. This is, of course, nothing more than a crude sketch of
the psychologyof the ascent, but one that emphasizes the roles that
the lower parts of soul have to play in it. This becomes important
when we look to explain the accomplished geometer’s automatic
drawings. The psychological explanation of such automatic action
appears to be that this is how the lower parts of soul respond to the
contemplation of the higher part, as Plotinus’ exegesis of the myth
in the Phaedrus makes clear:
Nor is [the object of contemplation] in every part of soul in the same way.
This is why the charioteer gives his horses some of what he sees, and they,
having received it, clearly would [still] desire what they saw. For they did
not receive all of it. And since they are desiring, if they engage in practical
action [piρÜττοιεν], they act [piρÜττουσιν] for the sake of what they desire.
And that is contemplation and the object of contemplation. (3. 8. 5. 33–7)
As we saw above, the contemplation of the rational part (the chari-
oteer) should have an e·ect on the lower parts of soul. They should
receive something from it in so far as they are turned towards
it, looking to it, and determined by it. The lower parts of soul,
however, are by their very nature deficient and incapable of true
contemplation, and for this reason they have to settle for ‘seeing’
what they can with the means at their disposal. Thus, in the accom-
plished geometer, the rational soul actually contemplates the true
objects of geometry, but this contemplation puts the sensitive soul
in a peculiar position. On the one hand the object of contemplation
does trickle down to it in some muted form, but on the other hand
this muted object of contemplation serves only to awaken or inten-
sify the sensitive soul’s desire to see this object more completely.
Although it is impossible for the sensitive soul qua sensitive soul to
fulfil this desire by actually contemplating the intelligible directly,
it still seeks to improve its contemplation, and it does so by the very
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means that originally helped the rational soul to ascend, namely by
moulding and drawing. In this way Plotinus’ description of practi-
cal men would also seem to apply to the lower parts of soul:
Men too, whenever they are too feeble to contemplate, create practical
action [τÂν piρëξιν piοιοupsilontildeνται] as a shadow of contemplation and of the for-
mative principle. For, because their [ability] to contemplate is inadequate
on account of a weakness of soul, they are not able to receive the object
of contemplation [i.e. the formative principle] adequately and for this rea-
son are not filled [by it], but since they desire to see it, they are drawn to
practical action, in order to see [with their eyes] what they could not see
with their minds. (3. 8. 4. 31–6)20
If this is right, then Plotinus would seem to think that which-
ever actions can be performed as practical actions, i.e. that aim
to correct a deficiency in contemplation, might also be performed
as productive actions, i.e. as actions that arise automatically from
contemplation—at least in so far as the actions in question pertain
to the lower parts of soul. This also allows for saying that such a
productive action of a sage is in some sense simultaneously a prac-
tical action. As far as the accomplished geometer’s rational soul is
concerned, the drawing of figures is productive by resulting auto-
matically from his contemplation. But from the perspective of his
sensitive part of soul, it is a practical action, since this part is still
deficient and is using the act of drawing to overcome this deficiency.
Plotinus’ remarks on the employment of technai further suggest
that moral actions might be produced in an automatic manner. It
might seem odd to lump actions of conventional virtue together
with the actions involved in crafts, especially since we can often
findPlotinus taking a rather deprecatoryattitude towards the crafts.
There are passages, for example, where he emphasizes the short-
comings of the technai when compared to Nature;21 elsewhere he
demeans craftsmen and their role in the polis (2. 9. 7. 5–7). Yet it is
precisely in these criticisms of the technai that we can see why it is
appropriate for us to consider them together with virtuous action.
For perhaps his most damaging criticism of the arts and crafts is
that they are directed at another (the bodily) rather than at the self
(the higher soul) (3. 8. 6. 19–30; 6. 1. 12. 26–30), and it is this that
would seem to make them o·-limits to the sage, since he is contin-
20 Armstrong’s translation is infelicitous at certain points. This translation is
closer to Theiler’s.
21 2. 9. 12. 18; 4. 3. 10. 16–19 (and see Armstrong’s note here); 4. 3. 21. 14.
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ually directed to his higher self. But this is exactly the criticism that
Plotinus typically levels against the acts of conventional virtue (3. 6.
5. 15–17; 4. 4. 43. 18–22; 5. 3. 6. 35–9), and so if other-directedness
is the problem, then the sage’s life will be bereft of both technical
actions and practical virtue. In fact, Plotinus himself underlines
their similarity in this respect. In 6. 3. 16. 13–32 he describes the
technai ofRepublic 7, namely arithmetic, geometry (presumably in-
cluding stereometry), music, and astronomy, as double, with one
kind directed at the intelligible world and one kind directed at the
sensible world. From this he concludes that the lower crafts should
be considered as belonging to the sensible world. He then goes on
to make e·ectively the same point about virtue: the conventional
virtues belong to the sensible world, while the cathartic virtues be-
long more to the intelligible world. Similarly, a central objection
that Plotinus advances against virtuous action in 6. 8. 5 is that it is
intrinsically dependent on and even compelled by external circum-
stances. An act of conventional courage, for example, depends on
there being a war of some kind, and if there is a war, a courageous
man is compelled to act. One conclusion that Plotinus draws from
this is that there is something almost paradoxical about virtuous ac-
tion. From a virtuous perspective, virtuous action is not desirable,
because there is nothing desirable about the external circumstances
that make virtuous action at once possible and necessary. And it is
in this regard that Plotinus once again likens virtue to craft:
For certainly if someone gave virtue itself the choice of whether, in order to
be able to act, it wants there to be wars for it to be brave in, or injustice so
that it might define and set down what is just, and poverty so that it might
demonstrate its generosity, or rather whether it wants to remain at rest
with all things being well, it would choose rest from action with nothing
requiring its services, just as any doctor, for example Hippocrates, would
prefer that no one required his craft. (6. 8. 5. 13–20)
The employment of crafts and the actions of conventional virtue
appear, therefore, to be in the same predicament. They are other-
directed, are dependent on and necessitated by external circum-
stances, and cannot be proper objects of desire in so far as the
accompanying circumstances are unwelcome.22 One might say that
this resemblance between virtuous and technical activity is due not
22 This is not to say that Plotinus nowhere distinguishes between the two. He
places, for example, the acts of practical virtue higher on the scale of beauty than
works of the crafts (1. 6. 9. 2–5). The point here is rather that obstacles that appear
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so much to a higher estimation of the technai—though, as we shall
see below, he does elevate them to some extent—as to a lower esti-
mation of the actions of conventional virtue.
Plotinus, however, also seems to think that this problem of other-
directedness can be overcome. He makes it clear, in any case, that
the sage will perform both technical actions and acts of conven-
tional virtue.23 Indeed, the performance of virtuous acts is closely
tied to technical know-how. The exhibition of traditional courage
requires all sorts of technical skills, e.g. swordsmanship, equestrian
and archery skills, etc. If the sage is to have a leading pedagogical
role,24 then he will probably need to make use of the psychagogical
technai, namely music and poetry, rhetoric, and suchlike.25 More-
over, not only is it hard to imagine that the sage would abstain from
practising basic skills suchas readingandwriting, but Plotinus even
insists that he will practise more arcane skills such as magic.26 But
even if it is clear that the sage is performing such activities, it is not
clear how this can be so given the problem of other-directedness.
Plotinus’ remarks on craft-knowledge and its employment suggest
that his solution to this problem might involve saying that such
actions flow automatically from the sage’s contemplation.
The disparaging passages on techn»e briefly reviewed above are
balanced by a number of passages where Plotinus is enthusiastic
about the crafts and emphasizes the similarities between them and
Nature. In particular, he emphasizes a handful of features of technai
that speak for understanding the proper performance of technical
activity to be automatic. First, he takes over from Aristotle the
to stand between the sage and technical action seem to be very much the same as
those that appear to stand between him and practical virtue. Plotinus’ remark about
the ends of crafts not being proper objects of desire might prima facie seem limited
to crafts such as medicine which aim at restoring the natural. But this should apply
to all crafts. The doctor qua doctor might wish for sickness and disease so that he
can practise his craft, but qua man he desires goodness and flourishing. So too, the
cobbler might qua cobbler desire that people need shoes, but qua man (or at least
virtuous man) he should desire that people’s needs are met so that they are not in
need of his services. The point of all skills is to compensate for shortcomings. But
no virtuous person could desire that there be shortcomings.
23 Regarding virtuous actions, see the discussion of 4. 4. 44 below.
24 As emphasized by Schniewind, L’ ‹Ethique, 161–70.
25 Cf. 4. 4. 31. 16 ·.
26 Plotinus repeatedly refers to magic as a techn»e (e.g. 1. 4. 9. 2; 4. 4. 26. 3; 4. 4. 43.
22), which is reasonable given his naturalistic understanding of magic as the ability
to manipulate the cosmos through the sympathy of its parts. In 4. 4. 43 ­ σpiουδαãος
is described as countering any spells put on him through his own use of magic.
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thesis that techn»e does not deliberate,27 and it is precisely such de-
liberate, calculated action to which automatic action is opposed. He
further describes the action of the handworker as simply flowing
from the craft itself in a manner suggestive of an automatic expe-
rience: ‘Just as even in the crafts, reason [is active only] when the
craftsmen are at a loss, but whenever there is no di¶culty, the craft
takes over and does the work’ (4. 3. 18. 5–7). And this should be
taken hand in handwith Plotinus’ observation that conscious atten-
tion to both technical activities and virtuous activities enfeebles the
activities.28 Plotinus even explains substandard artefacts in terms
of a deficiency in contemplation (3. 8. 7. 23–6). Hence, the pro-
ducts of the handcrafts are called images of the intelligible and
the good (e.g. 3. 8. 4. 44), just as virtuous actions are (e.g. 4. 4.
44. 26). Moreover, crafts are described as serving, correcting, and
completingNature by using the same logoi ultimately derived from
Intellect that Nature uses.29 For this reason the crafts, like Nature,
are responsible for delivering beauty from the intelligible world to
the sensible world,30 which is possible only through contemplation
(3. 8. 7. 23–7).
This provides strong reason for concluding that Plotinus thought
such actions could be performed automatically, at least under some
circumstances, though for most people they would be performed
by conscious e·ort. Those sceptical of this conclusion might do
well to consider an example from Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina
(part iii, chapters 4–5)—the famous account of Levin’s mowing
experience—which is extremely suggestive of something resem-
bling such a theory of automatic action. It would be di¶cult, if
not impossible, to come up with an account of automatic technical
action that is more detailed and compelling than this one.31 Here
Konstantin Dmitrich Levin has decided to join the muzhiks in
their seasonal mowing because in the past he noticed this helped
him maintain his character. At first he does a very poor job, though
27 4. 8. 8. 15–16; cf. Arist. Phys. 199b28–9.
28 1. 4. 10. 21–33. His examples include courageous action and reading, and he
adds that there are ‘very many others’.
29 5. 8. 1 passim; 5. 8. 5. 1 ·.; 5. 9. 5. 39–41 (and see Armstrong’s note).
30 1. 3. 2. 10–11; 1. 6. 2. 25–7; 2. 3. 18. 5–8; 2. 9. 16. 43–7; 5. 8. 1 passim.
31 All translations to follow are from Anna Karenina, trans. R. Pevear and L.
Volokhonsky (New York, 2000). The mowing account (251–6) should be read in
its entirety for its parallels to be fully appreciated. This short discussion benefited
from a correspondence I had with Julie Cassiday.
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he puts an enormous amount of e·ort and thought into it.32 Yet at
some point Levin begins to overcome this awkward start so that
his swaths come out perfectly; the mowing action itself becomes
e·ortless and transpires ‘without a thought’; he has ‘lost all aware-
ness of time’ and is in some sense ‘unconscious’ of what he is doing;
the action seems to flow into him from some external source ‘as if
by magic’; and he is ‘happy’. Note that for Levin this automatic
mowing remains somewhat sporadic. Whenever he encountered a
tussock, ‘he had to stop this by now unconscious movement and
think’. To this extent onemight complain that Levin is a poor illus-
tration of automatic activity. For automatic activity is above all to
be attributed to the sage who lives in continual contemplation and
is thus presumably exercising automatic action continually. Hence,
one might insist that automatic action should not come in a mere
sporadic manner, nor should it be endangered by obstacles as it is
in Levin’s case.33 Yet, of this superior instantiation of automatic
action, too, Tolstoy o·ers in the same passage an exemplary char-
acter in the form of an unnamed old muzhik man who constantly
produces perfect swaths in an e·ortless manner, even when he en-
counters tussocks or sloping gullies. Since the account is presented
from Levin’s perspective, we do not learn the details of the old
man’s inner life, but the construction of the passage seems to en-
courage us to attribute to him the same interior experiences that
Levin had, only in an uninterrupted manner that allows for a vari-
ety of complicated tasks.34 For now I would like to keep it an open
question whether Plotinus’ sage is better captured by the old man
than by Levin. What is important here is that Tolstoy’s descrip-
tion of the psychological lives of the mowers, and in particular the
aloofness with which they execute these activities, captures some
of the features that Plotinus makes essential to the ideal practice of
crafts, and collectively these features present an approach to phy-
32 Levin ‘swung strongly’ (249) and ‘had to strain all his strength’ (250). He also
rationally considers his technique: ‘“I’ll swing less with my arm, more with my
whole body,” he thought, comparing Titus’s swath, straight as an arrow, with his
own rambling and unevenly laid swath’ (250).
33 Cf. 4. 3. 18. 5–7, cited above.
34 Even the old man’s jocular attitude towards the sensible world (‘as if in play’,
‘gay’, ‘jocular’, ‘joking’; cf. the description of Titus working ‘as if playing with his
scythe’ (249)) is reminiscent of Plotinus’ view of the sensible world as an object of
play (3. 2. 15. 31–62; 3. 6. 7. 21–7; 3. 8. 5. 6–8; 4. 3. 10. 17–19), in particular when
compared to the old man’s very reverent attitude towards God: during a single break
from mowing, he o·ers two separate prayers (253–4).
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sical activity that does not require that one’s conscious attention
be directed to the sensible world and would therefore seem fully
compatible with contemplative activity.
Finally, Plotinus’ discussionof the activities of the celestial bodies
in 4. 4. 8. 48–61would also seem to support automatic action. Here
he is concerned to show that they are not even conscious of their
movements, which is to say that here again we have the problem
of other-directedness. In order to show this, he emphasizes that
an action that is not preferred (pro»egoumenon) does not produce a
conscious perception. He illustrates this principle through a sort
of psychological reflection on Zeno’s paradox.When someone con-
sciously steps a distance of one foot, one also necessarily passes
through an initial distance of, say, one inch without being conscious
of this passage in so far as it was not one’s intended or preferred
goal.35 This is exactly how Plotinus wishes to understand the local
motions of the celestial bodies. They execute these motions in such
a way that they are not preferred, and this is precisely the kind of
sensible activity that is compatible with their perpetual contempla-
tion, since it does not draw their attention to the sensible world.
Rather, just as the passage through the smallest fraction of a step
follows automatically from the step itself, without impinging on
one’s conscious thought, so too do the complex local motions of the
heavenly bodies36 seem to follow automatically from their contem-
plation of the intelligible.37
The significance of this account of celestial motion grows when
one bears in mind Plotinus’ view that the motions of the celestial
bodies—while not primarily causing sublunar events38—do serve
as signs of coming sublunar a·airs. This means that for celestial
things contemplation results in actions which are in tune with the
35 4. 4. 8. 19–30; cf. 4. 4. 7. 7–9.
36 Cf. Rep. 530 b 2–3 and Enn. 2. 1. 2. 8–10, with J. Wilberding (ed., trans., and
comm.), Plotinus’ Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II. 1 (40) (Oxford, 2006), ad loc.
37 And cf. 4. 4. 35. 42–4.
38 They are contributing causes of some events, however. The universe is de-
scribed as a contributing cause in 2. 3. 14. 15–17; 3. 1. 5. 21–2; 4. 4. 31. 3 ·.; 4. 9. 2.
28–33; the heavenly circuit in 2. 3. 10. 7–10; 3. 1. 6. 3–5; the celestial bodies in 2. 3. 8.
6–8; 2. 3. 12. 1–11; 2. 3. 14. 4–7; 2. 9. 13, 14–18; 4. 4. 6. 15–16; 4. 4. 30. 1–16; 4. 4. 31.
8–12; 4. 4. 38. 22–3; place in 2. 3. 14. 4–7 and 16; 3. 1. 5. 24–7. The e·ects for which
these cosmic agents are responsible include emotions and characters (2. 3. 9. 10–14),
dispositions and temperaments (2. 3. 11), corporeal states (3. 1. 6. 1 ·.), and perhaps
actions (4. 4. 30–1). For an excellent recent discussion, see P. Adamson, ‘Plotinus
on Astrology’, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 35 (2008).
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goings-on in this world and of which the celestial things themselves
are only remotely if at all conscious. And this is precisely how the
sage would behave according to the theory of automatic action. Of
course, human agents cannot be put on a par with celestial agents,
but it might still be the case that some contemplation leads to some
automatic action for humans as well as for celestials.39
4. Some evidence against automatic action
As was briefly discussed in the introduction, deliberation in action
seems to be a problem because it forces the rational soul to turn
its attention away from the intelligible towards the sensible. This
is what gives the theory of automatic action some of its force. For
in some important sense attention to the sensible world is incom-
patible with being directed to the intelligible. And since Plotinus
and Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus insist that practical action is in
fact compatible with ‘looking or being directed to the intelligible’
(βλÝpiειν piρ3ς τ3 νοητüν),40 one might conclude from this that prac-
tical action must proceed automatically. However, as we shall see
presently there is also an equally important sense in which attention
to the sensible world is compatible with ‘looking at the intelligible’.
It all depends on how we (and Plotinus) understand the expression
‘to look or be directed at something’ (blepein pros ti).
It is important to distinguish between the continuous state of
being directed to the intelligible and the intermittent state of union
with the One (cf. VP 8 ad fin. and 23). In the latter one actually
steps outside oneself and is taken over by the One. In this state ac-
tivity seems to be impossible. Plotinus makes it clear, for instance,
that virtue is left behind during such moments (1. 2. 7 and 6. 9.
11). The former state, however, seems to be compatible with acti-
vity. Porphyry, for instance, describes Plotinus as being continually
directed at the intelligible (piρ3ς τ3ν νοupsilontildeν)41 and yet engaging in all
sorts of demanding activities, such as conversations and managing
39 Note too the significance of Plotinus’ use of piροηγοupsilonacuteµενον here. Plotinus often
contrasts piροηγοupsilonacuteµενον and èναγκαãον (e.g. 6. 3. 16. 30–1), and as we shall see below,
the sage too is supposed to perform his actions not as preferred but as necessary.
40 Or sometimes χειν piρüς τι (e.g. 4. 4. 43. 22).
41 VP 8. 23; 9. 17–18; 23. 4. For Plotinus the Intellect (­ νοupsilontildeς) and its intelligible
object (τ3 νοητüν) are identical (Enn. 5. 5).
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financial accounts.42 This roughly fits with Plotinus’ own remarks
on contemplation and action. For as we shall see below, he clearly
thinks that the sage is engaged in action while remaining directed to
the intelligible. Yet he also makes it clear that at times the sage will
go beyond this continuous state, abandon himself and action, and
unite with the One (1. 2. 7; 4. 8. 1; 6. 9. 11). In what follows I shall
restrict my focus to the former, the question of how it is psycholog-
ically possible for the sage to be both turned towards the intelligible
world and engaged in practical action in the sensible world.
There are two general ways for these activities to be compatible.
The first is thoroughgoing, which is to say that even when the sage
is performing these sensible activities, his contemplative life goes
on as usual. This full compatibility seems prima facie somewhat
fantastic, since it amounts to saying that the sage can engage in
contemplation just as well on the battlefield as in his armchair. The
alternative would be amoremoderate version of compatibility. The
idea here would be that although sensible activity really does dis-
tract one’s reason from contemplation and prohibits one from ac-
tively contemplating at the same time, such activity is nevertheless
not incompatible with the contemplative life in so far as contem-
plation can immediately resume once these activities are completed
without having to go through the motions of reascending. These
two varieties of compatibility roughly correspond to two possible
senses of ‘looking or being directed at something’ (blepein pros ti)—
one attentive and one normative. In the former, attentive sense,
blepein pros ti is used in a very commonplace way to refer to one’s
attention being directed at some thing. For example, someone who
‘looks or is directed at’ a colour is simply looking at the colour and
taking in the impression it o·ers.43But Plotinus usually uses the ex-
pression in a much stronger and more normative sense, as in those
passages where it is used to describe the successful epistemic rela-
tion to the Forms.44 Here blepein pros ti means to take something as
a model, as, for example, in 4. 4. 12. 29–31: ‘But if [the soul] does
not know the future things which it is going to make, it will not
make them with knowledge or looking at any [model] but will make
whatever comes to it’, and in 1. 4. 6. 4–7: ‘But if well-being is to
42 VP 8. 19–20 and 9. 16–18.
43 Cf. 4. 5. 1. 24–6 and 4. 5. 2. 50–3.
44 Cf. the Demiurge in the Timaeus, who is said to βλÝpiειν piρ3ς τ3 κατ! ταupsilonlenisτ!
χον èεß (28 a 5–6).
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be found in possession of the true good, why should we disregard
this and omit to use it as a standard to which to look in judging
well-being?’45 Central to the issue of the sage’s relation to action is
the question of how these two senses of blepein pros ti are related.
If Plotinus thinks that they simply collapse into one, we end up
with a sage who, because he is clearly focused on the intelligible, is
unaware of what is going on around him in the sensible world. On
this account the sage is still capable of practical action—but only via
something comparable to a theory of automatic action according to
which his actions would simply fall from his contemplation without
him having to direct his attention to the sensibleworld. If these two
senses remain distinct, on the other hand, it should be possible to
direct oneself to earthly matters in the harmless sense of attending
to one’s daily business, without directing oneself to earthly matters
in the damaging sense of taking such things as one’s model.
Porphyry’sdescriptionof Plotinus’s interactionwith his students
both confirms our findings that contemplation and action are com-
patible and strongly suggests that the compatibility at issue is of
the more moderate variety. At VP 8. 11–15 he relates:
Even when he was talking to someone and engaged in conversation, he
kept to his speculation, so that while satisfying his necessary part in the
conversation he preserved his train of thought on the matters of his present
investigation.
This is a clear statement of the compatibility between theoreti-
cal contemplation and other-directed action. It is not, however, a
clear statement that both of these activities can actively be pursued
at once, as Harder’s and Br‹ehier’s translations would suggest.46 As
the larger contextmakes clear, Plotinushas already thought through
some issue from beginning to end before the conversation in ques-
tion takes place.47Once the conversation is over, he resumes putting
45 Both translations by Armstrong, who brings out well the normative sense in-
volved. In the former passage, I put ‘the soul’ in brackets to make the subject clear,
but the bracketed ‘model’ is Armstrong’s.
46 Harder: ‘Er konnte sich mit jemandem unterhalten und zusammenh•angende
Gespr•ache f •uhren, und doch bei seiner Untersuchung sein; was zum Gespr•ach
geh•orte, nahm er wahr, und gleichzeitig f•uhrte er unausgesetzt den Gedanken seiner
Untersuchung weiter’; Br‹ehier: ‘Il pouvait causer avec quelqu’un et entretenir une
conversation, tout en poursuivant ses r‹eflexions; il satisfaisait aux convenances de
l’entretien, sans s’interrompre de penser aux sujets qu’il s’‹etait propos‹e d’‹etudier’.
(See the Plotinus entries in the bibliography below for these translations.)
47 VP 8. 8–11.
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his thoughts downon the page as if he had never been interrupted.48
Thus, Porphyry is far from claiming that Plotinusmade active con-
templative progress while chatting over tea about some unrelated
subject. He is simply paying tribute to the resilience of his master’s
power of concentration. This, then, is how we should understand
his subsequent claim that Plotinus ‘was simultaneously present to
both himself and to others’ (VP 8. 19).49 The idea here is not that
Plotinus can actively be making progress in both the human and
the noetic arenas at precisely the same moment. Rather, they are
both present to him in the sense that he never loses touch of either,
and for this reason he can alternately pursue the one without losing
track of where he is in the other. Porphyry’s subsequent account
of Plotinus’ attention to his charges’ financial accounts should be
understood similarly. He says that ‘though [Plotinus] shielded so
many from the worries and cares of ordinary life, he never, while
awake, relaxed his attention [τÜσιν] towards the Intellect’.50 Here
again it would be unreasonable to understandPorphyry to be saying
that Plotinus actively contemplated while filling out his students’
tax reports. The claim is rather that Plotinus can direct his at-
tention to such trifling matters without cutting himself o· from
the intelligible world. While his advance in the intelligible world
is compromised by his attention to these mundane activities, his
preservation of intelligible presence benefits him in two significant
ways. First, as we saw in the previous example from VP 8, any
theoretical progress he has made is preserved in such a way that
he can access it immediately when his attention is again free to do
so. Secondly, the normative sense of blepein pros ti is surely pre-
served, which is to say that even when Plotinus is obliged to engage
in financial dealings, he is not ‘bewitched’ by them into thinking
that these things are genuinely important.51 It is a testament to his
preserved intelligible presence that he does not have to go through
the motions of reascending after such activities. This distinction
between attentive and normative directedness shows that the com-
patibility of contemplation and practical action does not necessarily
48 Ibid. 15–19.
49 On this see A. Smith, ‘The Significance of Practical Ethics for Plotinus’, in J.
Cleary (ed.), Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon (Aldershot,
1999), 227–36.
50 VP 9. 16–18: κα" ¬µως τοσοupsilonacuteτοις òpiαρκðν τ!ς εùς τ3ν βßον φροντßδας τε κα"
òpiιµελεßας τÂν piρ3ς τ3ν νοupsilontildeν τÜσιν οupsilonlenisδεpiοτ 8ν òγρηγορüτως òχÜλασεν (trans. Arm-
strong, revised). 51 On this aspect of bewitchment, see below on 4. 4. 44.
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demand a theory of automatic action. In fact, a closer examination
of Plotinus’ understanding of the psychology involved in both na-
tural and moral activities reveals, at the very least, that there must
be limits to any theory of automatic action.
By ‘natural activities’ I mean those activities that are directed
towards the body and care for it. Although this sort of activity
might seem trivial, the possibility of performing such activities
automatically might be critical to Plotinus’ understanding of the
sage. Plotinus pinpoints the origins of these desires in the body
itself—or more specifically the qualified body (τ3 τοιüνδε σðµα), i.e.
body plus a trace of soul—but the lower soul appropriates these
desires on account of its having sunk into body.52 Importantly,
neither the body nor the lower soul seems to be in a position to
satisfy these desires alone. Rather, the middle soul, reason, is said
to attend to the desires of the body and decide whether and how to
satisfy those needs.53 In other words, Plotinus describes even these
basic activities as requiring calculation and planning, and hence as
not being automatic. The significance of this emerges through a
comparison between a particular soul in its relation to its body on
the one hand, and the World-Soul and stellar souls in relation to
their bodies, the universe and stars respectively, on the other.54
TheWorld-Soul and stellar souls are analogous to our own souls
in two respects. First, each of them is responsible for a specific body,
just as we are. Moreover, their souls are also divided into two parts
or powers: a higher soul that remains above and contemplates and
a lower soul that takes on responsibility for the body.55 However,
Plotinus emphasizes over and over again that the World-Soul and
stellar souls, unlike particular souls, care for their bodies without
calculation or planning.56Does this mean that an individual human
being, too, can care for his or her body in this automatic way, if only
he or she achieves the status of sage? There are good reasons for
thinking that this is not the case. For the automatic maintenance of
52 4. 4. 20, esp. ll. 25–35, and 4. 4. 21. 19–21.
53 4. 3. 12. 6–8; 4. 4. 20. 16–19 and 33–6 (where τ3 µÝν refers to the body, the
first τÂν δÝ to nature, and the second τÂν δÝ to the higher soul); 4. 4. 21. 7–14; 4. 8.
5. 26–7; cf. 2. 1. 5. 21–3.
54 This situation of stellar souls is equivalent to that of the World-Soul (4. 8. 2.
38–42—see below).
55 2. 3. 18. 12–13; 3. 8. 5. 9–16; 4. 3. 4. 21–9; 4. 3. 11. 8–12; 4. 8. 2. 26–33; 4. 8. 7.
26–31; 4. 8. 8. 13–16. Stars, too, are said to have lower souls or natures in 2. 3. 9. 34–5.
56 e.g. 2. 2. 2. 26–7; 2. 3. 17. 9–11; 2. 9. 11. 8–9; 4. 4. 11. 4–5; 4. 8. 8. 15.
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the universe and stars is due in large part to special features of the
bodies being maintained. The body of the universe has its parts in
their natural places: that is, earth is already at the centre and fire
at the periphery.57 Furthermore, it su·ers no loss of parts58 and
is not attacked by other bodies outside of it,59 and consequently
does not require nourishment in order to replace any lost parts.60
Likewise, the stars are made up only of a special kind of fire called
corporeal light whose natural place is in the heavens and which is
especially co-operativewith their souls. Therefore, even though the
stars are parts of the universe and not wholes, they do not su·er any
(external) flux and consequently do not require any nourishment
either.61 It is on account of all of these features that these bodies
themselves are said to have nodesires orneeds (4. 8. 2. 48–9), andare
therefore able to co-operate in such a way that the souls responsible
for them, i.e. their lower souls, take care of them without toil (and
hence everlastingly).62 This in turn is the reason why the higher
parts of the World-Soul and stellar souls do not have to ‘sink’ into
body by applying their cognitive faculty to work at maintaining
their bodies (4. 8. 2. 46–53).63Rather, each of them can ‘keep itself
in a place of safety’ (4. 3. 6. 21–2).
By contrast, human bodies, like the bodies of all sublunar living
things, are made up of a collection of elements that are forcibly
constrained to remain in unnatural places. The fire in a human
body, for example, tries to leave the body and move up to the
periphery of the universe. Hence, our individual natures must act
as a ‘second bond’, trying to keep the body’s constituent parts in
their place,64 but in spite of this the constituent elements achieve
some degree of success in these attempts and for this reason we
57 2. 9. 7. 27–32; 4. 8. 2. 10–11; cf. 2. 1. 3. 5–7.
58 2. 1. 3. 2–4; cf. 2. 9. 7. 30.
59 1. 1. 2. 13 ·.; 1. 2. 1. 11–12; 2. 1. 1. 14; 2. 1. 3. 10–12.
60 4. 8. 2. 18–19; cf. Tim. 33 c 4–8 and Enn. 2. 1. 3. 25–6.
61 2. 1. 7. 27 ·., and see Wilberding, Cosmology, 45–62.
62 2. 1. 3. 10–12, where after µηδÝν one should understand εã or piεισι, and not
òστιν as Armstrong does. See Wilberding, Cosmology, ad loc. and 49–50.
63 This is why the maintenance of the universe by Nature is repeatedly said to
proceed without planning or reason (e.g. 2. 2. 2. 26–7; 2. 3. 17. 9–11; 2. 9. 11. 8–9;
4. 4. 11. 4–5; 4. 8. 8. 15). By contrast, in the case of individual bodies, it is precisely
reason that is forced to provide for the lower parts of the soul and their bodily
concerns. On this, see below. This is also the reason why Plotinus can say that the
World-Soul is not subject to enchantment (5. 1. 2. 11–14).
64 2. 9. 7. 28–30; cf. 2. 1. 5. 8–14; 4. 8. 8. 16–23.
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require nutrition, unlike the universe and the celestial things. But
as we saw above, it is the middle (rational) soul that must provide
for the bodily desires of the lower parts of soul, and so, unlike
the universe and the celestial things, the maintenance of a human
body does require reasoning, since it is for reason to answer the
lower parts’ crieswhen our bodyneeds attention.65Thismeans that
the very feature that allowed the World-Soul and stellar souls to
maintain their bodies automatically and therefore to contemplate
without interruption is problematically absent in our case,66 and
this absence is reflected in the status of the middle soul. There
does not even seem to be a middle soul for the World-Soul and the
stellar souls, since they do not operate by planning and calculation.
But for us the middle soul is all-important.67 Our higher souls are,
after all, always contemplating no matter what we do,68 and our
lower souls are more or less committed to the body. It is the middle
soul and its respective attention to what lies above and below it
that determines the extent of one’s sagacity. Hence, our relation to
contemplation appears to be jeopardized by these natural activities
to the extent that our middle soul provides for the needs of the
body and lower soul.69 All of this suggests that while it would be
extremely helpful if our bodies could be maintained automatically,
the fractional nature of our bodies precludes precisely this.
In spite of all this, the possibility of automatic natural activity
might be defended up to a point. After all, animals are in a similar
position to humans in so far as they, too, are parts of the universe
and not the universe as a whole, being made up of elements that
strive to get back to their natural places and requiring nourishment
to replace them, and animals are able to maintain their bodies with-
out the calculations of reason, since according to Plotinus animals
do not possess faculties of reason.70This is e·ectively an admission
that it is possible to perform these natural activities, such as keep-
65 See above, n. 53, and 4. 8. 2. 11–14; 4. 8. 4. 12–21.
66 To make matters worse, at one point Plotinus even suggests (2. 1. 5. 8–14)
that it is not just our bodies that create problems, but that our lower souls are also
deficient compared with that of the World-Soul (2. 9. 7. 7 ·.; 4. 3. 6. 10–15), and
that the sublunar region is itself e¶cacious in some negative way.
67 This is no doubt related to our being ‘in the middle’ between gods and beasts
(3. 2. 8. 4–11).
68 On this see T. Szlez‹ak, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins (Basel and
Stuttgart, 1979), 167–9.
69 4. 3. 17. 26–8; 4. 8. 3. 25–7; 4. 8. 4. 18–21.
70 Reason, being the ‘middle’ soul, is between gods and animals (3. 2. 8. 4–11).
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ing warm and consuming food, without the aid of planning and
calculation, although Plotinus does not give details as to how such
activities could be executed without them.71 Perhaps this opens
up the possibility that the sage, too, can accomplish these things
without actually directing his rational attention to them. There
is, however, a problem with suggesting that the sage’s execution of
these activities proceeds in amanner similar to that of animals. Ani-
mals simply do what comes naturally. At best, dogs eat when they
are hungry, but at worst they eat whenever there is food around,
and this is not the manner of bodily care that Plotinus envisages
for the sage. Rather, he says that the sage needs to neglect his body,
though not entirely:
There must be a sort of counterpoise on the other side, towards the best, to
reduce the body and make it worse, so that it may be clear that the real man
is other than his outward parts . . . He will take care of his bodily health,
but will not wish to be altogether without experience of illness, nor indeed
also of su·ering. (1. 4. 14. 11–14, 21–3, trans. Armstrong, slightly revised)
One reason for this delicate neglect is that if the body grows too
strong, the strength of its desires and their ability to attract reason’s
attention will likewise increase. Hence, even of health there can
be too much for the sage (1. 4. 14. 8–11).72 So the sage’s care
for his body will be decidedly di·erent from that of animals for
their bodies, and indeed one might say it is di·erent from the
natural approachto bodilymaintenance.This seems to compromise
the claim that the sage’s bodily upkeep could proceed in the non-
reflective manner that it does in animals, since reason needs to play
71 As R. R. K. Sorabji has shown (Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, NY,
and London, 1993), 7–29), the denial of reason in animals requires an expansion of
their perceptual content, in order to account for the variety of activities in which
animals engage. Some nutritive activities must find some analogous explanation,
since plants, which lack even sensation, perform them (1. 4. 1. 21–3).
72 This is drawn from Plato’s account inRepublic 9 of how to groom the tripartite
soul so that reason can rule.He emphasizes that the appetitive part must beweakened
so as not to be in a position to challenge reason’s authority (588 e–589 b). Schniewind
argues that this ‘counterpoise’ serves only a pedagogical role: the sage’s body shows
his comrades and acquaintances that the goal in life is not to be found in the bodily
(161–5). But in my opinion this fails to account for ll. 8–11 and especially for ll. 17–
19: piερ" δÁ σοφ3ν ταupsilontildeτα æσως µÁν 8ν οupsilonlenisδÁ τÂν èρχÂν γÝνοιτο, γενοµÝνων δÁ òλαττþσει αupsilonlenisτüς,
εæpiερ αupsilonasperτοupsilontilde κÞδεται. This passage clearly states that it is for the sage’s own sake, i.e.
for the sake of his higher soul, that he ‘reduces’ his body.While Schniewind is right
to draw out this pedagogical function directed to others, a weak body and lower
soul is also important to the sage himself, since a robust body would demand more
attention.
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an active role in order to achieve this kind of delicate neglect. After
all, it is hard to imagine that the lower soul, when left to its own
devices and desires and needs, would ‘reduce the body and make
it worse’.
The lower soul, however, is not left to its own devices. Plotinus
repeatedly emphasizes the need to train and habituate the lower
soul,73 and it is reasonable to suppose that part of this training
is aimed at habituating the lower soul, for example, to consume
less than would be conducive to a robust body. This training is, of
course, performed by reason and ultimately should allow the sage
to take care of his body, to some extent at least, without turning
away from the intelligible world (2. 9. 15. 15–17).74 More impor-
tantly, according to the metaphysical psychology described above,
the sage’s contemplation should have a positive e·ect all by itself
on the lower part of soul. In so far as the lower soul is constantly
looking to and informed by the middle soul, all of the actions of the
lower soul will in some sense flow from the middle soul even when
it is not consciously directing its activity. Hence, the desires and
actions of the sage’s lower soul are not due merely to habituation;
rather, they are the mediate result of the sage’s contemplation. Por-
phyry’s report that Plotinus’s contemplation reduced the amount
of sleep he needed can be viewed as an example of how contem-
plation can have a positive trickle-down e·ect on the needs and
desires of the lower parts of soul.75 So it would seem that the sage
might have some chance of emulating the stars, though Plotinus
indicates clearly enough at times that any such emulation has its
limits, even for the sage.76
73 This is political virtue—political in the psychological sense of a soul that is ana-
logous to a city, i.e. tripartite (cf. 4. 4. 17. 23–35)—which is achieved by habituation
and training (1. 1. 10. 11–14; 6. 8. 6. 22–5; 1. 3. 6. 6–7; 2. 9. 15. 15–17).
74 It might be one’s own reason that trains the lower soul, but more probably it
is another’s reason—e.g. that of one’s parents or educators.
75 VP 8. 21–3. Moreover, Porphyry reports that Plotinus had built up a certain
resistance to magic: the magical assault on Plotinus backfired because of ‘the great
power of Plotinus’ soul’ (VP 10). This is significant because magic properly a·ects
only the body and lower soul, so that any resistance to it that he had acquired would
suggest that Plotinus’ contemplative activity as a philosopher had some sort of e·ect
on his lower soul. For an alternative view, see L. Brisson, ‘Plotin et la magie’, in
L. Brisson et al. (eds.), Porphyry: La Vie de Plotin (2 vols.; Paris, 1992), ii. 465–
75 at 465–8, who suggests that Plotinus’ resistance is not automatic, but results
rather from ‘les e·orts de la partie rationelle de l’a^me’ and in particular through
arguments and exhortations (467).
76 1. 4. 15. 16–20, and see below.
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These limits to any theory of automatic action seem to be made
most explicit in Plotinus’ discussion of moral psychology in 4. 4.
44. This chapter is part of a larger section (4. 4. 40–5) in which
he examines the e¶cacy of magic and enchantment, which for the
most part Plotinus restricts to the lower parts of soul (4. 4. 43. 3–5).
For Plotinus magic loses any trace of the supernatural because it
is Nature itself that is responsible for the e¶cacy of magic spells,
which simply exploit the cosmic sympathy at work in the universe.
Yet an individual’s rational soul can also fall victim to enchantment
if one allows it to become too attached to the lower parts of soul.
This serves as a point of departure for Plotinus in 4. 4. 43–4 to
examine the kind of psychological enchantment that takes place
entirely within an individual soul, namely when the lower parts
of soul and in particular nature ‘enchant’ one’s rational part.77 In
this he is drawing on Phaedo 81 b 3–4, where the soul is said to
be ‘enchanted’ (γοητευοµÝνη) by the body and its pleasures and
desires, and on Rep. 3, 413 b 1 ·., where Socrates describes how
men might lose the beliefs they received through education by
‘being enchanted’ (γοητευθÝντες) by pleasures or fears. The central
question of this discussion concerns the relative susceptibility of
the man of contemplation and the man of action to such internal
enchantment. The main conclusion of the discussion is that the
contemplative man is not subject to magic, but we also find here
a discussion of what it is about practical activity that might be
opposed to contemplation and in what way the contemplative man
might engage in moral action. For this reason the chapter deserves
close attention.
The critical point that Plotinus makes against practical activity
is that it is necessarily motivated by the lower part of the soul:
‘reason does not provide the impulse, rather the premisses [prota-
seis] of passion are the starting-point and belong to the irrational’.78
He supports this general claim by going through nine di·erent
categories of action and showing how in each case an irrational mo-
tivation is at work:
(1) care for (one’s) children (ll. 6–7);
(2) eagerness to get married (l. 7);
77 Cf. 4. 4. 43. 22–3 and 44. 29–30.
78 ll. 5–6: οupsilonlenisχ ­ λüγος τÂν ­ρµÞν, èλλ èρχÂ κα" τοupsilontilde èλüγου α¦ τοupsilontilde piÜθους piροτÜσεις.
Note that Armstrong puts a comma after èλüγου and translates rather awkwardly.
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(3) whatever entices humans through appetitive pleasure (ll.
8–9);
(4) actions caused by our spirit (l. 9);
(5) actions caused by our appetite (l. 10);
(6) political activity and desire for o¶ce (ll. 10–11);
(7) actions taken to avoid su·ering (l. 12);
(8) actions taken to increase one’s share (l. 13);
(9) actions taken on account of necessities and which seek to
satisfy nature’s needs (ll. 14–15).
There are several things to note about this list. First, many of
these categories of action are already described in psychological
terms in such a way that it becomes more or less tautologous to
say that they are necessarily motivated by the lower soul, e.g. (4)
or (5). Yet other categories, e.g. (1) (2), and (6), are not described
psychologically,so that Plotinus’ psychologicalclaimbecomesmore
substantive, though hardly unreasonable. After all, it is realistic
to say, for example, that marriage and children are objects of the
generative soul and that it therefore supplies an irrational desire
for them, so that any action aimed at these ends will be at least
partially irrational in its motivation, and similarly for the spirited
part of soul and its desire for power.
This depreciatory account of the motivation behind actions in
the sensible world might seem to make them completely o·-limits
to the sagewhohas advanced to contemplation and therefore turned
his reason away from the body and lower soul, but in the sequel
Plotinus suggests otherwise. This begins with an objection: ‘What
if someone says that the actions [praxeis] concerned with noble
things are not subject to enchantment, or else even contemplation,
since it is of noble things, must be said to be under enchantment?’
(ll. 16–18). One might expect Plotinus to answer this objection by
going through his distinction between contemplation and action,
but instead he o·ers a more nuanced account of the practical man
and his relation to practical actions by distinguishing two ways in
which actions might be performed.
In this more nuanced account, the practical man is no longer
defined simply by the fact that he performs actions. Rather, his at-
titude to these actions becomes all important, the distinctive feature
of his attitude being that he is taken in by the mere traces of nobi-
lity that these noble actions possess, and—similar to Plato’s lovers
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of sights and sounds—is unaware that there is something else be-
yond these actions that is truly noble. And this is why he chooses to
perform these noble actions (ll. 25–7). Plotinus strikingly describes
the practical man both as ‘choosing’ (α¦ρεãται, l. 26) and as being
‘dragged by his irrational impulses’ (λχθÝντα èλüγοις ­ρµαãς, l. 31).
As we shall see, a combination of necessity and choice is also promi-
nent in the contemplative man’s relation to action, though in a very
di·erent way. Here the practical man chooses in the sense that this
could hardly be described as a case of weakness of will, where the
rational part of the soul is helpless in its attempt to achieve the goal
it set for itself on account of the coerciveness of the irrational parts.
Rather, this action is precisely what the rational part wants, and
so it steers the soul to action. His freedom of choice, however, has
been compromised by his ill-gotten conception of nobility, and this
is where the irrational impulses come in. Without getting into the
psychological mechanics, Plotinus acknowledges (surely correctly)
that certain desires have the power to change the way we see the
world,79 and the problem with the practical man is that the desires
of his lower parts of soul have exercised such a power. As a re-
sult the practical man believes, for example, that su·ering really is
bad and that the death of one’s child is a genuine tragedy. Hence,
he comes to the conclusion that conventional human flourishing is
life’s noble end (to kalon), and it is this that he aims to promote.
The irrational impulses, therefore, do not drag him in the akratic
sense of overpowering; rather, they do so by exercising their power
of enchantment over the rational soul.
The alternative to the practical man’s approach to action is de-
scribed in ll. 18–24 as the approach that the contemplative man
takes.80 We are told that he performs these actions ‘as necessary’.
79 This again is in tune with Plato’s remarks about how certain passions can
influence the (rational) soul (Phaedo 81 b and Rep. 413 b ·.). For Plato erotic desire
was particularly dangerous in this regard (Phdr. 238 e; Rep. 572 e–573 b).
80 That this is a description of the contemplative man is clear from the character-
ization given here. We are told that (i) he is not enchanted (l. 20), (ii) he does not
look to the things in this world (ll. 20–1) and his life is not other-directed (l. 21),
(iii) he has no false illusions about his actions—he knows they are merely necessary
(ll. 18, 20), (iv) he grasps something else, namely what is truly good (ll. 19–20), and
finally (v) he nevertheless does act when necessary (ll. 18–19). These are precisely
the characteristics that mark the contemplative man: (i) he alone is not subject to
enchantment (ll. 1–2 and 33); (ii) he is self-directed rather than other-directed (l. 2)
and so does not have to pursue (ll. 34–5); (iii) his reason is not deceived by his lower
parts of soul (ll. 34–6); (iv) what is good is in his possession (l. 36); and yet he does
do what is required of him (l. 4).
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The discussion leading up to this remark would suggest that the
necessity in question concerns the impulses coming from the lower
soul. The rational soul is in some sense required to fulfil the de-
mands of the lower soul. This fits well with the description of the
lower impulses themselves. They are described as protaseis (l. 6) or
premisses in a syllogism, and as such one would expect some action
to follow necessarily from them. Likewise, and more specifically,
the ninth category above is explicitly said to deal with the necessary
demands of nature. Both the practical man and the contemplative
man, then, are subject to the necessity coming from the lower soul.
The di·erence between them is that the practical man is enchanted
by this necessity into believing that flourishing in the sensibleworld
is all-important, while the contemplative man retains the appropri-
ate perspective. He does act, but he acts out of compulsion coming
from his lower soul, realizing that these actions are not what is truly
noble (ll. 18–20).81 He is not enchanted ‘because he knows the ne-
cessity and does not direct his gaze to this world, and because his
life is not directed to other things’ (ll. 20–1).This last phrase is par-
ticularly significant, since it was precisely the other-directedness of
the practical man’s life that made him susceptible to enchantment:
Everything that is directed to [piρüς] something else is enchanted by some-
thing else. For what it is directed to enchants it and directs it. Only what is
directed to itself is not susceptible to enchantment. Therefore, both every
action and the entire life of the practical man are in a state of enchantment.
For he is moved to those things that charm him. (4. 4. 43. 16–20)
81 Plotinus is making a distinction in these lines between being enchanted and
(merely) being forced, but the text as it is punctuated by Henry–Schwyzer (and
thus translated by Armstrong and others) obscures his point. I believe the text of
4. 4. 44. 16–24 should be as follows: εù δÝ τις λÝγοι τ!ς piρÜξεις τðν καλðν èγοητεupsilonacuteτους
ε4ναι Í κα" τÂν θεωρßαν καλðν οupsilonlenistildeσαν γοητεupsilonacuteεσθαι λεκτÝον, εù µÁν ½ς èναγκαßας κα" τ!ς
καλ!ς λεγοµÝνας piρÜξεις piρÜττοι λλο τ3 ôντως καλ3ν χων, οupsilonlenis γεγοÞτευται. ο4δε γ!ρ
τÂν èνÜγκην κα" οupsilonlenis piρ3ς τ3 τ²øδε βλÝpiει, οupsilonlenisδÁ piρ3ς λλα ­ βßος. èλλ! τ²ø τøς φupsilonacuteσεως τøς
èνθρωpißνης βßªα κα" τ²ø piρ3ς τ3 ζøν τðν λλων Í κα" αupsilonlenisτοupsilontilde οùκειþσει. δοκεã γ!ρ εupsilonlenisacuteλογον
æσως µÂ òξÜγειν αυτ3ν δι! τÂν οùκεßωσιν ¬τι οupsilonasperacuteτως òγοητεupsilonacuteθη. In ll. 21–3 one should
mentally supply piρÜττοι or something to that e·ect (cf. l. 4 Ñ δεã piοιεã). The idea is that
the contemplative man acts by compulsion but is not enchanted. Armstrong’s trans-
lation, following the punctuation of H–S2, makes the contemplative man enchanted
by this necessity, thereby eliminating the very distinction Plotinus is working to
establish. I also believe that Theiler (and following him Henry–Schwyzer, Arm-
strong, et al.) was wrong to delete ¬τι in l. 24. I understand ll. 23–5 to be saying that
even though we are all compelled by our natural concern for ourselves and others
to act in certain ways, this is no reason to commit suicide (in the hope of leaving
such concerns behind), because (¬τι) by committing suicide (οupsilonasperacuteτως) one has been
enchanted (òγοητεupsilonacuteθη). On suicide see Enn. 1. 9.
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The important question here concerns the sense in which the con-
templative man is not directed to this world. As we saw above,
there are two general senses possible. One involved directing his
conscious attention to the goings-on in this world, while the other
was more normative and amounted to setting one’s moral compass
by the sensible world, which is to say taking the states of physical
well-being to be the summum bonum.
The details of 4. 4. 44 strongly suggest that Plotinus has only
the latter sense in mind here. He places explicit emphasis on the
sage’s life (­ βßος, 4. 4. 44. 21) not being directed at other things,
and on the sage’s being in possession of the correct conception of
what is genuinely good, this being di·erent from the object of his
practical actions. Finally, we are told that the contemplative man
is ‘compelled’ by his lower soul to perform these actions, and that
does not sound at all like automatic action.82 So it looks as though
what we have here is the more moderate version of compatibility:
action is compatible with the contemplative life, but not because
one is simultaneously acting and contemplating.
82 One might fairly demand to know the sense in which the contemplative man’s
rational soul is compelled or necessitated by the lower soul here. Often Plotinus
writes as if the sage is simply morally obliged to care for bodies and their needs
as long as he is in the sensible world (e.g. 4. 3. 12. 6–8; 4. 8. 4. 31–3; 4. 8. 5. 10–
14). This might suggest that the sage is obeying a categorical imperative to look
after the body and lower soul, yet a categorical imperative would seem to fit rather
awkwardly into a teleological philosophical system such as Plotinus’. The sense of
necessity might, therefore, be more hypothetical. The actions might be necessary in
the sense of constituting conditions that need to be met in order for contemplation
to take place. Michael of Ephesus (In EN 583. 3–584. 26, esp. 583. 33–4 Heylbut)
suggests something along these lines, insisting that the sage should pursue bodily
health as necessary and not preferred since a sick body can obstruct contemplation,
and it is contemplation which is preferred (cf. Porph. Abst. 53. 10–12). Plotinus
might want to say something similar here about noble acts of virtue. If the lower
soul really is incorrigibly concerned with the welfare of living bodies, it might
be counter-productive for the rational soul to deny its urgings completely, since
as Plato insisted, suppressing a necessary appetite results in that desire building
up and eventually overtaking the soul (Rep. 571 e 1–2). Hence, the rational soul
would have to perform noble acts of virtue in order to keep the lower soul at least
minimally content. Yet Plotinus seems to reject the idea that disturbances in the
body will inhibit one’s contemplation. In 1. 4 [46]. 4. 25–32, for example, he repeats
the position we have found in 4. 4 [28]. 44 that the sage will indeed take care of
the body’s needs with an attitude of necessity, but here Plotinus makes it clear that
the necessity is not hypothetical. Even in times when the body’s needs cannot be
fulfilled, the sage’s contemplation and thus his happiness are not diminished (and
cf. 1. 4 [46]. 14. 26–31). Other senses of necessity are surely possible as well. One
might, for example, say that these actions are necessary for the sage in the sense that
not all the circumstances involved in them are under his control (see Rist, Road,
132), but note that this would not explain why the sage is performing these actions.
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What this discussion of 4. 4. 44 has shown is that despite the
arguments in favour of automatic action provided above, Plotinus
seems to think that, at the very least, automatic action has its limits.
For in 4. 4. 44 we find the contemplative man being compelled to
practical action by his lower soul and remaining in contemplation
only in the moremoderate sense of not losing his intelligible ideals.
This need not mean that the sage’s action is never automatic, but
it does strongly suggest that it often is not.
5. Conclusion
What has been shown is that Plotinus’ psychologyand in particular
his account of how the lower parts of soul are formedby andrespond
to the achievements of the higher parts demand something like
automatic action. For any improvement in one level of soul will
automatically trickle down to the next level, which is turned to it
and formed by it, and in so far as these lower levels of soul are
intrinsically concerned with the sensible world, their response will
be in the form of sensible activity. Further, Plotinus’ account of
both crafts and the actions of the heavenly bodies also seems to
point in this direction. The contentious question that remains has
to dowith the extent to which the sage’s acts of virtue are performed
automatically. For as we have now seen, the sage does not appear
to be always acting in an automatic manner, though this need not
be at odds with his contemplative life.
However, one could easily raise a number of objections to any
account of sagacious virtuous action regardless of the above caveats
and limitations. First, according to the metaphysical psychology as
described in Section 3, it would seem to be the sensitive soul rather
than the rational soul that is responsible for these virtuous actions,
and that seems bizarre both because the sensitive soul would turn
out to be rather sophisticated and because to the extent that reason
is not involved, the actions themselves would be, if not irrational,
then at least non-rational. Second, the solemn struggle to determine
the right course of action seems to lie close to the core of our ethical
experience, and any account that disregards this pensive e·ort does
not really seem to be an account of ethical action at all. As Rist
remarks, ‘the brave man is not an automaton whose reflexes simply
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cause him to act bravely’.83 Third, it is audacious enough to say
that the sage performs virtuous actions without any deliberation,
but this account seems to go even further by suggesting that he is not
even conscious of any virtuous act that he performs automatically,
and surely such blind acts do not deserve to be called virtuous.
These piercing objections swiftly expose to view this account’s
distance from our modernmoral intuitions, but perhaps they over-
state the case against automatic action. Surely it must be granted
that there is something bizarre about saying that the sage’s virtuous
actions are executed solely by the sensitive soul. Such a figurewould
indeed approachRist’s automaton. This characterization, however,
draws its force from an oversimplification of Plotinus’ psychology.
The sensitive soul does not exist in a vacuum, and the sage’s sensi-
tive soul in particular is turned to and formed by his rational soul.
This means, first of all, that the lower soul is not merely on auto-
pilot nor are these actions merely the result of habituation. That
would be a di·erent and lower kind of virtue (at least according to
the later discussions of levels of virtue).84 The problem, of course,
with such habitual virtue is that it lacks understanding. The little
boy lets the old woman have his seat in the bus simply because he
was brought up that way. He might say and even think that it is
a good thing to do, but he does not understand what goodness is.
This is not the case with the sage. He does understand what the
Good is (or at least virtue at the intelligible level). Moreover, the
sage’s good actions and his understanding of the Good are not two
unrelated phenomena. Even after the training and when reason is
not stepping in, there is a sense in which his actions are flowing
from his understanding. Hence, the sensitive soul is far from be-
ing the sole executor of these actions. According to the theory of
automatic action, reason is involved in the sage’s actions, but in a
unique way. Reason does not turn down and attend to the needs of
the sensitive soul and body. This, after all, would come at the cost
of its contemplation. Rather, the sensitive soul looks up to reason
and participates in it, and in this way its activities are informed by
reason without reason being distracted.85 Does this mean that the
sage is completely unconscious of his actions? Probably not. Recall
how Tolstoy described Levin’s mowing experience also in terms
of his being unconscious of the movement. This can hardly mean
83 Road, 132.
84 e.g. Porph. Sent. ≈32. 85 And cf. 4. 4. 12. 1 ·.
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that Levin had no idea where he was or that he was mowing. His
obliviousness is limited to his technique and the mechanics of his
swinging the blade. Such unconsciousness is not a drawback but a
consequence of real expertise, be it in craft or in moral behaviour.86
In order to illustrate the attractiveness of such a position, con-
sider some case of moral action with a more or less obvious answer:
for example, a wealthy man, full from a large lunch, happens to win
a large bag of fresh bagels and then on his way out of the restaurant
encounters a starving child on the street. Not only is it clear that the
man should give some of the bagels to the starving child, but there
even seems to be something monstrous about anyone who really
has to deliberate about the matter. In such obvious cases—rare but
perhaps not as rare as moral sceptics would have us believe—the
immediacy with which one responds to the situation is a key ethi-
cal element of one’s action. And it is perhaps reasonable to expect
that for a sage, who really understands what it is to be good, a
great part of his ethical life will consist of such obvious cases to
which he can provide an immediate correct response. To bring the
issue to a point, the modern moral intuition that ethical behaviour
must be deliberative is at odds with the intuition (central to virtue
ethics) that immediacy is itself essential to many ethical responses.
A Plotinian theory of automatic action would side with the latter
intuition but without rendering the action irrational in doing so,
since reasonwould still be influential in a non-deliberativemanner.
It is perhaps fitting to conclude by reiterating Plotinus’ caveat re-
garding the extent to which human beings can give themselves over
to automatic action. As we saw above in the discussion of natural
activities, Plotinus underlined a number of critical di·erences be-
tween sublunar living things on the one hand and superlunar living
things and the universe on the other, all of which went in the direc-
tion of saying that the former simply cannot live in the automatic
and carefree manner of the latter. This verdict is echoed in certain
other passages. In 3. 2. 14. 16–20, for example, Plotinus declares
that human beings will never achieve the zenith of virtue because
they are parts.87 This is also part of his explanation of the cycle of
86 This would also be comparable to the celestial things’ awareness of the goings
on down here (4. 4. 6–12). See A. Smith, ‘Unconsciousness and Quasi-Conscious-
ness in Plotinus’, Phronesis, 23 (1978) 292–301.
87 κα" νθρωpiος δÞ, καθ ¬σον µÝρος, καστον, οupsilonlenis piëς. εù δÝ piου òν µÝρεσß τισι κα" λλο
τι, Ñ οupsilonlenis µÝρος, τοupsilonacuteτ®ω κèκεãνο piëν. ­ δÁ καθ καστα, ²2 τοupsilontildeτο, οupsilonlenisκ èpiαιτητÝος τÝλεος ε4ναι
εùς èρετøς κρον· õδη γ!ρ οupsilonlenisκÝτ 8ν µÝρος. This problem of being parts, again, does
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life and death, since in his view only death puts us in a position to
contemplate in the manner of the World-Soul and celestial things
(4. 8. 4. 31–5).88 Thus, even the sage—to the extent that the sage
really exists and is not merely an ideal—will at times encounter
obstacles that draw him out of his contemplative state. When such
obstacles are present, the sage will maintain his normative direct-
edness to the intelligible world while directing his attention to the
sensible world. Just like Levin, when he encounters a tussock, the
sage will be forced to deliberate how best to deal with certain situ-
ations. The question remains: just how many tussocks will there
be in the sage’s world?
Newcastle University
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